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Abstract 
 
This article examines European Union legislation on civilian firearms currently in place. This is with 
the aim of assessing its effectiveness in preventing and suppressing illicit firearms trafficking, which, 
in recent years, has considerably contributed to the growing threats of terrorism and transnational 
organized crime in Europe. The author contends that, notwithstanding undeniable progress, 
especially after the entry into force of Directive 2017/853/EU, the European Union regulatory 
framework still requires some steps forward in order to comprehensively tackle illicit firearms 
trafficking. 
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Questo contributo prende in esame la legislazione dell’Unione europea sulle armi da fuoco civili. In 
particolare, al fine di valutare la sua adeguatezza nella prevenzione e repressione del traffico illecito 
di armi da fuoco il quale, nel corso degli ultimi anni, ha contribuito alla crescita esponenziale della 
minaccia terroristica e del crimine organizzato transnazionale in Europa. La tesi qui sostenuta è che, 
nonostante i numerosi progressi, in particolare a seguito dell’entrata in vigore della direttiva UE 
2017/853, il quadro normativo dell’Unione europea richieda ulteriori miglioramenti al fine di 
contrastare più efficacemente il traffico illecito di armi da fuoco. 
 
Parole chiave: traffico illecito, armi da fuoco, Direttiva UE 2017/853, crimine organizzato 
transnazionale, terrorismo 
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1. Introductory remarks: the growing threat of illicit firearms 
trafficking in the European Union 
According to the most prominent official sources1 Europe faces a serious illicit 
firearms trafficking (IFT) threat. Broadly speaking, IFT refers to ‘weapons that are 
produced transferred, held, or used in violation of national or international law’2. 
IFT is an important factor contributing to terrorist attacks that have taken place in 
Europe in recent years, threatening the security of European Union (EU) Member 
States and their citizens3. IFT is also heavily fueling other transnational organized 
criminal activities, such as drugs smuggling and human trafficking4. There are 
several ways in which firearms can enter the illicit market (including illicit 
manufacturing, thefts, diversion, conversion, etc.)5. The true scale of IFT in the EU is 
quite difficult to quantify as a consequence of the hidden nature of this market6. 
Available information suggests that the great majority of illicit firearms actually 
circulating in the EU derive from cross-border trafficking activities. Since the early 
1990s this has been especially from the following main routes: firearms smuggled 
from the former Soviet Union, conflict zones in the Balkans, and more recently North 
Africa7. In addition, there is the growing trade in so called ‘converted firearms’8, 
some of which originate in EU Member States9. These call for a stronger, coordinated 
EU approach to controlling the use of weapons and counteracting IFT, as well as 
combatting crime and terrorism. There is little official data on the types 
(civil/military) of firearms circulating in the EU, weapons illegally used and 
                                                          
1 EUROPOL, European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2017, p. 54 
(available at www.europol.europa.eu). 
2 Matt Schroeder, Captured and Counted: Illicit Weapons in Mexico and the Philippines, in Small Arms 
Survey, Everyday Dangers, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 283-317. 
3 See Paragraph 6, infra.  
4 European Commission, Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit 
Firearms Trafficking in the European Union, Final Report, European Commission, July 2014, pp. 11-
12 and 30-31.  
5 The bulk of illicit firearms enter the illicit market by means of diversion; see Ernesto Savona, Marina 
Mancuso, Fighting Illicit Firearms Trafficking Routes and Actors at European Level, Final Report of 
Project FIRE, 2017, p. 27 ss. 
6 European Commission, Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit 
Firearms Trafficking in the European Union cit., p. 12 ss. 
7 Ibid., p. ii; Ernesto Savona, Marina Mancuso, Fighting Illicit Firearms, op. cit., p. 56 ss. 
8 For a definition of ‘converted firearms’ see Paragraph 6, infra. 
9 Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, From Legal to lethal, Converted Firearms in Europe, Small Arms 
Survey, 2018, p. 12. 
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trafficked, and of criminal offences involving firearms10. However, it has become 
clear that gaps in the EU legislation on firearms, and shortcomings in its 
implementation at national levels, foster criminal activities, and have a negative 
impact on the overall level of EU citizens’ security.  
The EU regulatory framework on IFT encompasses both hard law (directives and 
regulations) and soft law instruments (action plans, etc.), which simply address 
recommendations that States may decide to adopt or not. The European Agenda on 
Security (EAS)11, adopted by the Commission on 28 April 2015, prioritized the fight 
against terrorism, organized crime and cybercrime, as interlinked areas with a 
strong cross-border dimension; and identified, i.a., the need to strengthen the legal 
framework on firearms and to combat illicit trafficking12. The Commission argued 
that differences in national legislation of firearms are an obstacle to controls and 
police cooperation. As an urgency, it pointed out the need for a common approach 
on the neutralization and deactivation of firearms, to prevent reactivation and use 
by criminals13. In the aftermath of the 2015 terrorist attacks in Europe, and with the 
aim of implementing the EAS, the Commission adopted a package of measures 
known as “the EU gun ban”, including: i) a proposal to amend the EU Firearms 
Directive (Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC), to tighten 
controls on the acquisition, possession and circulation of firearms14; ii) an 
Implementing Regulation on common minimum standards for deactivation of 
firearms15; iii) and an Action Plan against illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and 
                                                          
10 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on European Commission, 
Evaluation of Council Directive 91/477/EC of 18 June 1991, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC of 21 
May 2008, on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, COM(2015) 751 def., 18/11/2015, 
para. 19, p. 7.  
11 European Commission, The European Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final, 15/08/2015. 
12 Ibid., p. 17.  
13 Ibid.  
14 European Commission, Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, 
COM(2015) 750 final, 18/11/2015. 
15 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 of 15 December 2015 establishing common 
guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques for ensuring that deactivated firearms are 
rendered irreversibly inoperable, in OJEU L 333/62, 19/12/2015. 
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explosives16. After some rounds of Trilogue negotiations17, on 17 May 2017, the 
European Parliament and the Council adopted Directive 2017/853/EU18, amending 
Directive 91/477/EEC (the new Firearms Directive).  
This article examines EU legislation on civilian19 firearms currently in place, with 
the aim of assessing its effectiveness in preventing and suppressing IFT. It contends 
that, notwithstanding undeniable progress, especially after the entry into force of 
the new Firearms Directive20, the EU regulatory framework still requires some steps 
forward in order to comprehensively tackle IFT. This study covers neither soft law 
instruments, nor the external dimension of EU legislation adopted to combat illicit 
accumulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW)21.  
 
 
2. The first EU regulatory framework on firearms: Directive 
91/477/EEC 
The acquisition, possession and circulation of civilian firearms within the EU is 
subject to a comprehensive regulatory framework, originally set out in the already 
mentioned Directive 91/477/EEC (Firearms Directive)22. It establishes common 
                                                          
16 European Commission, Implementing the European Agenda on Security: EU Action Plan against 
illicit trafficking in and use of firearms and explosives, COM(2015) 624 final, 2/12/2015. 
17 This formula refers to informal tripartite meetings attended by representatives of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission. 
18 Directive (EU) 2017/853 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017 amending 
Council Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons; in OJEU L 
137/22, 24/05/2017. 
19 Civil firearms include weapons manufactured for self-protection, the provision of private security 
services, shooting sports and hunting, etc. 
20 In accordance with its Article 3 Directive (EU) 2017/853, in force as of 24/07/2017, on the 
twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
21 SALW refer to weapons which are manufactured to military specifications for use as lethal 
instruments of war; broadly speaking, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use, and 
light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew.  For a classification of 
SALW, including ammunitions, see Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, UN 
Doc. A/52/298, 27/08/1997, Annex. For an overview of the EU strategy against the proliferation of 
SALW see Council of the European Union, EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking 
of SALW and their ammunition, Doc. 5319/06, 13/1/2006; and the contribution of Alessandra Lang 
in this Journal.  
22 Council Directive of 18 June 1991 on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons 
(91/477/EEC), in OJEC L 256/51, 13/09/1991; for an overview of Directive 91/477/EEC see André 
Collet, L’Europe des armes, une double démarche, in “Revue trimestrelle de droit européen”, (1) 1992, 
pp. 105-110; Luis Leme, The Council Directive on Control of the Acquisition and Possession of Weapons 
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minimum standards, which Member States have to transpose into their national 
laws, and is aimed at balancing internal market objectives (i.e. cross border 
movement of firearms) and security policy purposes (to guarantee a high level of 
security for European citizens). Directive 91/477/EEC is based on the rationale that 
mutual confidence among Member States requires that the abolition of controls at 
intra-Community frontiers is underpinned by partially harmonized legislation on 
firearms23. The Firearms Directive consequently determines the category of 
firearms whose acquisition and possession by individuals are prohibited, or subject 
to authorization or declaration24; and lays down the minimum requirements that 
Member States must impose as regards the acquisition and possession of the 
different categories of firearms. The transfer from one Member State to another 
while in possession of a weapon should, in principle, be prohibited, unless a specific 
procedure is adopted that enables Member States to be notified that a firearm is to 
be brought into their territory (the ‘European firearms pass’ grants more flexible 
rules for hunting and target shooting)25. 
Directive 91/477/ECC does not specifically address IFT26. However, it does contain 
a few provisions that are indirectly relevant to leakage of firearms to the illicit 
market. First, the above mentioned categorization of firearms is aimed at preventing 
citizens from a Member State with strict laws from easily buying a weapon in 
another Member State with more permissive legislation and then taking it back with 
them to their State of origin. This could encourage smuggling27. Second, directive 
91/477/ECC establishes an obligation on Member States to domestically register 
                                                          
and its Categorization of Firearms: A Rational Approach to Public Safety?, in “Harvard International 
Law Journal”, 37(2) 1996, pp. 568-581.  
23 Directive 91/477/EEC (Preamble, paras. 4 and 5). 
24 Id (Annex 1); Category A lists prohibited firearms (automatic weapons, etc.); these weapons must, 
in principle, be excluded from private possession. Categories B and C contain the firearms subject to 
licence or to reporting. Category D comprises other firearms, which may be sold freely.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Preamble, para 8: “Whereas the Directive does not affect the right of Member States to take 
measures to prevent illegal trade”. 
27 On this point, see Toine Spapens, Trafficking in Illicit Firearms for Criminal Purposes within the 
European Union, in “European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice”, 2007, p. 359 ss., 
p. 374.  
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firearms that enter the market28 and to exchange and share information relating to 
firearms29. 
 
 
3. The ‘minimalist approach’ and the limited effective contribution 
of Directive 2008/51/EC to eradicate IFT  
The existing EU legislative framework dealing with IFT largely derives from the UN 
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts 
and Components and Ammunition (UNFP)30, which supplements the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC)31. The UNFP is an 
international instrument to which both the EU and its Member States are parties32. 
Directive 2008/51/EC, amending Directive 91/477/ECC33, intervened to reinforce 
its ‘security aspects’, and to partially integrate into the Firearms Directive the 
appropriate provisions required by the UNFP as regards intra-Community transfers 
of firearms34. The EU completed the process of transposition into EU legislation of 
                                                          
28 Art 4. 
29 Art. 13. 
30 The UNFP (see United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2326, A-39574), was adopted in May 2001 as the 
third supplementary Protocol to the UNTOC, by General Assembly resolution 55/255, 08/06/2001. 
The UNFP entered into force on 3 July 2005. It is aimed at promoting and strengthening international 
cooperation and developing cohesive mechanisms to prevent, investigate and prosecute the offences 
stemming from the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms.  
31 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2225, I-39574.  
32 In accordance with Council Decision 2001/748/EC of 16 October 2001 concerning the signing on 
behalf of the European Community of the UNFP, annexed to the UNTOC (in OJEC L 280, 24.10.2001, p. 
5), the Commission signed the Protocol on behalf of the Community on 16 January 2002; for the 
subsequent European Union approval of the UNFP see Council Decision of 11 February 2014 on the 
conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; in OJEU L 89/7, 25/03/2014.  
33 In OJEU, L 179/5, 08/07/2008. 
34 Recital 3 of Directive 2008/51/EC. Furthermore, the legislative intervention was necessary in 
order to improve certain issues, in particular those that were identified in the report of the 
Commission to the European Parliament of 15 December 2000 on the implementation of Directive 
91/477/EEC; see Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The 
implementation of Council Directive 91/477/EEC, of 18 June 1991, on control of the acquisition and 
possession of weapons, COM (2000) 837 final. Brussels, 15.12.2000. According to this report, the legal 
framework created by the Directive was sufficient as a whole. However, key problems related to the 
national implementation of the Directive were identified in some areas (difficulties with the exchange 
of information; disparity and complexity of national legislations, administrative measures and 
authorization procedures; differences in the classification of hunting and sporting firearms). This 
underlined the need for clarification of certain provisions (e.g. defining certain types of weapons, 
namely deactivated and antique weapons) to ensure a more uniform application of the Directive. 
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UNFP provisions through Regulation 258/201235, which addresses the trade and 
transfers of firearms with countries outside the EU36. Directive 2008/51/EC 
introduced into the EU legislation definitions (and a new classification) of 
‘firearms’37, ‘illicit manufacturing’38 and ‘illicit trafficking’39.  
Directive 2008/51/EC, in clear continuity with Directive 91/477/ECC, essentially 
aims to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market of licit firearms, and to 
strengthen the security of EU citizens from dangers arising from them, through a 
variety of preventive measures. Accordingly, it supplemented the minimum 
conditions for the acquisition and possession of firearms for civil use, and further 
harmonized administrative requirements for their transfer and circulation within 
the EU40. Pursuing the objective to align EU legislation to legal requirements of the 
UNFP, it introduced into Directive 91/477/EEC several stipulations that are quite 
                                                          
35 Regulation (EU) no. 258/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 march 2012 
implementing Article 10 of the United Nations’ Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and 
trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (UN Firearms Protocol), and establishing export 
authorisation, and import and transit measures for firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition; in OJEU, L 94/1, 30/03/2012.  
36 EU Regulation 258/2012 is based on the principle that firearms and related items should not be 
transferred between States without the knowledge and consent of all States involved. It establishes 
procedural rules for export, and import - as well as for transit of firearms, their parts and components 
and ammunition. Exports of firearms are subject to export authorizations, containing the necessary 
information to trace them, including the country of origin, the country of export, the final recipient 
and a description of the quantity of the firearms and related items. Member States have the obligation 
to verify that the importing third country has issued an import authorization. In the case of transit of 
weapons and related items through third countries, each transit country must give notice in writing 
that it has no objection. Member States must refuse to grant an export authorization if the person 
applying has any previous record concerning illicit trafficking or other serious crime. 
37 ‘[…] “firearm” means any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be 
converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant, unless it is 
excluded for one of the reasons listed in Part III of Annex I. Firearms are classified in part II of Annex 
I’; see art. 1, par. 1(a) Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC.  
38 ‘[…] “illicit manufacturing” means the manufacturing or assembly of firearms, their parts and 
ammunition: (i) from any essential component of such firearms illicitly trafficked; (ii) without an 
authorisation issued in accordance with Article 4 by a competent authority of the Member State 
where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or (iii) without marking the assembled firearms at 
the time of manufacture in accordance with Article 4(1)’; see art. 1, par. 2(a) Directive 91/477/EEC, 
as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC.  
39 ‘[…] “illicit trafficking” means the acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their 
parts or ammunition from or across the territory of one Member State to that of another Member 
State if any one of the Member States concerned does not authorise it in accordance with the terms 
of this Directive or if the assembled firearms are not marked in accordance with Article 4(1)’; see Art. 
1, par. 2(b) Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC.  
40 See new art. 5 and revised art. 6 and 7 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 
2008/51/EC. 
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relevant to counter IFT. Such measures include some specific obligations aimed at 
facilitating the tracing41 of firearms. First, Member States must ensure that any 
firearm or its parts placed on the market has been marked and registered42. For this 
purpose, Member States, at the time of manufacture of each firearm, require either 
a unique marking (including the name of the manufacturer, the country or place of 
the manufacture, the serial number and the year of manufacture) or maintain any 
alternative marking with a number or alphanumeric code, thus allowing clear 
identification of the country of manufacture43. In order to facilitate and strengthen 
the traceability of firearms Directive 2008/51/EC also obliges Member States to 
introduce national computerized data-filing systems44 (which will register key 
information on all circulating firearms in Member States)45. It improves the 
exchange of information among Member States (through the establishment of a 
contact point)46 and provides a few minimum standards on deactivation of 
firearms47.  
In 2015 the Commission published a Report (REFIT Report)48 on the 
implementation of Directive 91/477/EEC (as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC). 
At the outset, with specific reference to security, the REFIT Report raises a 
                                                          
41 For a definition of tracing, see footnote n. 66, infra. 
42 See art. 4, par. 1 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC. 
43 See art. 4, par. 2 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC. The marking shall 
be affixed to an essential component of the firearm, the destruction of which would render the 
firearm unusable. 
44 Either a centralised system or a decentralised system, which guarantees access to authorized 
authorities to the data-filing systems in which the necessary information regarding each firearm is 
recorded (see art. 4, par. 4 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC). Access by 
police, judicial and other authorised authorities to the information contained in the computerised 
data-filing system must be subject to compliance with Article 8 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (see Recital 8 Directive 2008/51/EC).  
45 While the UNFP provides that the registers containing information on weapons are to be kept at 
least 10 years, Directive 2008/51/EC, in view of the dangerous nature and durability of weapons, 
extends this period up to a minimum of 20 years in order to allow the proper tracing of firearms 
(information shall include: firearm type, make, model, calibre and serial number, as well as the names 
and addresses of the supplier and the person acquiring or possessing the firearm); throughout their 
period of activity, dealers are required to maintain a register in which all firearms subject to the 
Directive and which are received or disposed of by them are recorded, together with such particulars 
as enable the firearm to be identified and traced; see art. 4, par. 4 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 
by Directive 2008/51/EC.  
46 Art. 13 par. 3 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC.  
47 See Paragraph 6, infra. 
48 Evaluation of Council Directive 91/477/EC of 18 June 1991, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC of 
21 May 2008, on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, cit.  
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methodological problem, namely the absence of disaggregated data on the 
types/categories of firearms circulating in the EU, and/or illegally used and 
trafficked, as well as the lack of comparable and detailed data on trends in criminal 
offences and activities involving civilian firearms at the EU level49. As to its 
effectiveness, the REFIT Report underlines that, in general terms, Directive 
91/477/EEC (as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC) has positively contributed to 
increasing the level of security. This is especially due to a) the introduction of tracing 
requirements for Member States authorities (i.e. computerized registry) and the 
obligation for dealers to register all firearms transactions, b) marking obligations 
for manufacturers and c) minimum requirements for the acquisition and possession 
of firearms50. The Commission was however hampered in addressing a more 
comprehensive assessment of its effectiveness in connection with the security 
objectives. In particular, this was due to the lack of an information base including 
specific and detailed data on criminal offences committed with legally owned 
firearms, converted alarm weapons and reactivated firearms in EU Member States51. 
In addition, the REFIT Report also underlines that the implementing process of the 
Firearms Directive has shown several inconsistencies, and revealed its very limited 
impact to counter IFT. This is mainly due to the lack of clarity and vagueness of some 
of its provisions. In this regard, the REFIT Report especially points out some 
limitations. These include a) the limited harmonization of the rules on marking 
(differences in marking standards which limited the ability to trace firearms), b) 
differences in deactivation techniques and standards as well as in the designation of 
the authority carrying them out52, c) differences in categorization and registration 
of firearms in national legislations, which also cause problems in traceability and 
law enforcement53, d) the lack of interconnection of national tracking and data filing 
                                                          
49 Ibid., para. 19. 
50 Ibid., para. 21.  
51 Ibid., para. 22. 
52 Ibid., para. 27. Such differences cause concerns as not only the authority or actor in charge of the 
deactivation might not have the necessary technical skills, but also because the standards in some 
Member States are not considered sufficient.  
53 This is the case in particular when an object considered as a firearm in one Member State is 
transferred to a Member State where it is not considered as a firearm any longer and hence the 
authorities lose trace of it. 
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systems, e) the unclear definition of convertibility in the Firearms Directive54 and f) 
differences in the interpretation of key terms included in the Directive (essential 
components, brokers, alarms weapons and antique weapons). Based on these 
findings, the Commission concludes its assessment recommending a legislative 
intervention (through a new amendment of Directive 91/477/EEC, in particular 
with the aim: i) of clarifying the definition of convertibility and to establish common 
criteria to define alarm weapon, ii) of continuing the harmonization of standards 
and rules on deactivation of firearms; and iii) of strengthening the harmonizing 
rules on marking55. 
 
 
4. The ‘security’ oriented approach of Directive 2017/853/EU  
The overall objectives of Directive 2017/853/EU mirror those established by 
previous EU legislation on firearms. It finds its legal basis in Article 114 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (in line with the initial legal basis of the 
Firearms Directive), aiming to better regulate (and facilitate) the functioning of the 
internal market in firearms, while guaranteeing a high level of safety for EU citizens. 
However, since the Commission submitted its proposal in 2015, it became quite 
clear that the new amendment of Directive 91/477/EEC would have been strictly 
focused on ‘security issues’. The Commission framed its first draft text as a 
legislative response to emerging and increasingly more complex security threats, 
including the challenge of IFT56. The Preamble of Directive 2017/853/EU reflects 
this approach stating that: ‘certain aspects of Directive 91/477/EEC need to be 
further improved in a proportionate way, in order to address the misuse of firearms 
for criminal purposes and considering recent terrorist acts’57. Accordingly, many of 
its provisions expressly deal with issues that have a great impact on security, taking 
into account the conclusions of studies that the Commission carried out in the 
                                                          
54 See Paragraph 6, infra.  
55 Evaluation of Council Directive 91/477/EC of 18 June 1991, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC of 
21 May 2008, on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, cit., para. 34.  
56 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 
91/477/EEC cit., para.1. 
57 See Para. 2 of Preamble, Directive 2017/853/EU. 
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preparatory phase58. On the whole, the new Firearms Directive does not go beyond 
what is necessary to achieve the objective of ensuring the security of EU citizens 
without unnecessarily restricting the internal market (proportionality principle)59. 
Another rationale inspiring Directive 2017/853/EU is that organized crime and 
terrorism threats and the potentially huge social and economic costs of violent 
actions (including IFT), are inherently characterized by their transnational nature, 
affecting more than one Member State at the same time. In this sense, the EU is 
required to intervene because these security issues cannot be dealt with in a fully 
satisfactory manner either by the individual Member States, or bilaterally 
(subsidiarity principle)60.  
By establishing a stricter regulation of the acquisition, possession61 and online 
trade62 of licit firearms, the new Firearms Directive will positively contribute to 
preventing the leakage of licit firearms to the illicit market. Member States’ 
obligation to take all appropriate measures in order to prohibit (with very limited 
exceptions)63 the acquisition and possession of firearms, the essential components 
and the ammunition classified in Category A (prohibited firearms)64, will also be 
                                                          
58 See Paragraph 3, supra. 
59 See para. 33 of Preamble, Directive 2017/853/EU. 
60 Ibid.  
61 See new art. 5 Directive 91/477/EEC (as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU). 
62 The new Firearms Directive stipulates that the acquisition of firearms, essential components 
and/or ammunitions through the Internet shall require the permission of a collector or a broker; see 
new art. 5a Directive 91/477/EEC (as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU). A report of the 
Commission (see European Commission, Evaluation of the Firearms Directive, Final report, 
December, 2014, pp. 50-51) demonstrated the increasing use of the Internet as a sales channel for 
firearms and the growing difficulties in controlling this online market. The role of the Internet in the 
illicit arms trade was confirmed in recent terrorist attacks (see Paragraph 6, infra) where in some 
cases firearms were illegally assembled with components legally purchased via Internet. Another 
very challenging problem is the role of emerging illicit firearms markets in the dark Web; however, 
this issue is not addressed by Directive 2017/853/EU; for a detailed study on the dark Web see 
Ernesto Savona, Marina Mancuso, Fighting Illicit Firearms, op. cit., p. 62 ss. 
63 Under new art. 6 para. 2 Directive 91/477/EEC (as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU) such 
exceptions refer exclusively to those firearms held for the protection of the security of critical 
infrastructures, commercial shipping, high-value convoys and sensitive premises, as well as for 
national defense, educational, cultural, research and historical purposes. In such cases, the national 
competent authorities may grant, in individual cases, exceptionally and in a duly reasoned manner, 
authorizations for firearms, essential components and ammunition classified in category A where 
this is not contrary to public security or public order. Also collectors may be authorized (under very 
strict conditions) to acquire and possess firearms, essential components and ammunition classified 
in category A (see art. 6, para. 3). 
64 Member States shall ensure that those firearms, essential components and ammunition unlawfully 
held in contravention of that prohibition are seized; see art. 6, para. 1 Directive 91/477/EEC (as 
amended by Directive 2017/853/EU). 
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useful to indirectly pursue the above mentioned goal. The same is true for the ban 
of the most dangerous semi-automatic firearms, which move from Category B 
(firearms subject to authorization) to Category A of Directive 91/477/EEC, and will 
not, under any circumstances, be allowed to be held by private persons, even if they 
have been permanently deactivated65. 
 
 
5. Enhanced traceability of firearms  
Directive 2017/853/EU provides for several measures specifically dealing with the 
prevention and suppression of IFT. The enhancement (through a reinforced 
normative framework) of the traceability66 of firearms is at the heart of the new 
Firearms Directive strategy against criminal activities. The traceability of firearms 
is of paramount importance to allow law enforcement and judicial authorities both 
to prevent (detect) and to investigate and prosecute IFT offences67. For this purpose, 
the new Firearms Directive aims first of all to better harmonize Member States’ 
legislation on the marking of firearms which, as already pointed out68, was lacking 
in uniformity and facilitated criminals in illegally trading weapon parts or illicitly 
reactivating firearms69. Directive 2017/853/EU obliges Member States to introduce 
tighter rules on marking of firearms in three areas, in order for them to be better 
tracked in case of theft, loss, diversion from the licit market, or illicit trafficking. With 
respect to marking techniques, the Commission must adopt binding implementing 
acts establishing technical specifications and common standards, so that the 
                                                          
65 See Annex 1, Part II new category A7 Directive 91/477/EEC (as amended by Directive 
2017/853/EU). 
66 ‘[…] “tracing” means the systematic tracking of firearms and, where possible, their parts and 
ammunition from manufacturer to purchaser for the purpose of assisting the competent authorities 
of Member States in detecting, investigating and analysing illicit manufacturing and illicit trafficking’; 
see art. 1, para. 1 (13) Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. 
67 According to Interpol firearms tracing can: link a suspect to a firearm in a criminal investigation; 
identify potential firearm traffickers; detect firearm crime trends; targeted intelligence-led police 
operations aimed at curbing the firearms supply to terrorist networks and violent individuals; see 
Interpol, Illicit Arms Records and tracing Management System (iARMS), 2018; available at 
www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Firearms-trafficking/INTERPOL-Illicit-Arms-Records-and-tracing-
Management-System-iARMSiCC. 
68 See Paragraph 3, supra. 
69 See European Commission, Evaluation of the Firearms Directive, cit., p. 64. 
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marking of firearms will be harder to erase70. Second, the obligation of marking is 
extended to imported firearms71, as required by the UNFP72. Finally, as to the 
placement of the mark, Directive 2017/853/EU clarifies that, with respect to 
firearms manufactured or imported into the Union on or after 14 September 2018, 
the marking will be affixed on any essential component73 of the firearm74. With 
respect to traceability, Directive 2017/853/EU also establishes an obligation to 
extend records by keeping computerized data-filing systems in the Member States 
for a period of 30 years after the destruction of the firearms or essential components 
concerned75. There is also a more efficient sharing of information between dealers 
and brokers, on the one hand, and national competent authorities, on the other76. 
Finally, the Commission must provide for an electronic system to improve the 
exchange of information on firearms among Member States77. 
                                                          
70 See art. 4, para. 2a Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. 
71 See art. 4, para. 1 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. 
72 See art. 8 UNFP. 
73 ‘Essential component’ means the barrel, the frame, the receiver, including both upper and lower 
receivers, where applicable, the slide, the cylinder, the bolt or the breech block, which, being separate 
objects, are included in the category of the firearms on which they are or are intended to be mounted; 
see art. 1, para. 1(2) Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. 
74 See art. 4, para. 1 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. According to a 
study of the Commission (see European Commission, Evaluation of the Firearms Directive, cit., p. 64) 
“Differences related to the placement of the mark and namely to the essential components to be 
marked […] create room for criminals to illegally trade firearms parts that can be used to build or 
reactivate a firearm. Moreover, the disassembly of a fully assembled weapon in which only one 
essential component was marked can provide a source of unmarked essential components that can 
be sold to other member State without being traced”.  
75 See art. 4, para. 4 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. This is in view of 
the dangerous nature and durability of firearms and essential components, in order to ensure that 
competent authorities are able to trace firearms and essential components for the purpose of 
administrative and criminal proceedings.  
76 To facilitate this, national competent authorities should establish a means of electronic connection 
accessible to dealers and brokers, which can include submission of the information by email or 
directly through a database or other registry (see art. 4, para. 3 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended 
by Directive 2017/853/EU). Access to these records and all related personal data should be 
restricted to competent authorities and should be permitted only up until 10 years after the 
destruction of the firearm or essential components concerned for the purpose of granting or 
withdrawing authorizations or for customs proceedings, including the possible imposition of 
administrative penalties, and up until 30 years after the destruction of the firearm or essential 
components concerned where that access is necessary for the enforcement of criminal law.   
77 “The competent authorities of the Member States shall exchange, by electronic means, information 
on the authorisations granted for the transfer of firearms to another Member State and information 
with regard to refusals to grant authorisations as provided for in Articles 6 and 7 on grounds of 
security or relating to the reliability of the person concerned”; see new art. 13, para. 4-5 Directive 
91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. The main problems in relation to the exchange 
of information dealt with the difficulty to identify national contact points in some cases, the lack of 
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6. Regulatory measures on ‘converted firearms’  
The term ‘converted firearms’ refers to modifications of an object that is incapable 
of firing a projectile, to one capable of doing so78, and typically indicates: i) the 
conversion of imitation firearms – or any object resembling a firearm, but incapable 
of expelling a projectile – to lethal-purpose weapons79; and ii) the reactivation of 
deactivated firearms80. In 2014, the Commission published a study81 underlining the 
challenge of converted firearms, which represent a new peculiar feature of ITF. The 
problem of converted firearms has emerged in Europe in the last two decades, 
particularly as a consequence of the Balkan wars82. Directive 91/477/EEC does not 
regulate firearms conversion. A first major change in the EU legislation to address 
illicit firearms conversion came with the adoption of Directive 2008/51/EC, which 
introduced a revised definition of what constitutes a firearm. This definition 
included weapons that ‘may be converted to expel a shot’83. Although this definition 
was an important achievement, EU legislation left Member States free to decide the 
technical standards that would be required to prevent conversion. Moreover, 
Directive 2008/51/EC obliged Member States to introduce national procedures for 
the deactivation of firearms, which render the weapons permanently inoperable, to 
be verified by a competent authority84. The REFIT Report identified several 
                                                          
transparency, and the fact that information on firearm transfers were mainly paper-based; see 
Evaluation of the Firearms Directive, cit., p. 70. 
78 See Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, From legal to lethal, op. cit., p. 16.  
79 Following the classification proposed by Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, ibid., p. 18, non-lethal-
purpose imitation firearms easily convertible into firearms include: alarm weapons/blank-firing 
firearms and airsoft (or air/gas guns). 
80 Deactivated firearms refer to real firearms rendered permanently unfit for use. Other firearms 
whose firing capabilities were significantly downgraded included: acoustic expansion weapons - 
AEWs (real firearms modified to be unable to fire a solid projectile), and firearms modified to Flobert 
calibres (real firearms modified or designed for Flobert calibres, which are unrestricted in some 
countries); see Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, ibid. Converted firearms also include a third 
category, namely the modification of semi-automatic firearms into automatic ones. 
81 See European Commission/SIPRI, Study to support an Impact Assessment on a possible initiative 
related to improving rules on deactivation, destruction and marking procedures of firearms in the EU, 
as well as on alarm weapons and replicas, Luxembourg, June 2014. 
82 Ibid., p. 10 ss. 
83 ‘For the purposes of this Directive, an object shall be considered as capable of being converted to 
expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of a combustible propellant if: it has the appearance of 
a firearm, and as a result of its construction or the material from which it is made, it can be so 
converted.’; see art. 1, par. 1(a) Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC. 
84 Annex I, section III Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC. These minimum 
restrictions include the obligation for Member States to make arrangements for the deactivation 
measures to be verified by a competent authority. This authority shall ensure that the national 
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problems arising from the implementation of Directive 91/477/EEC (as amended 
by Directive 2008/51/EC) provisions regulating converted firearms. These were 
namely the lack of clear definitions on alarm weapons, and the lack of technical 
guidelines and common rules on deactivation85 and ‘convertibility’. They created 
scope for national interpretation, which resulted in differences in national 
approaches, but also produced cases of incomplete or improper implementation of 
the Firearms Directive at the national level. All these loopholes and shortcomings in 
the EU legislation have created vulnerabilities (and limited traceability of converted 
firearms) that significantly bolstered the smuggling of these weapons and other 
criminal activities throughout Europe; and have created several obstacles for law 
enforcement and for police and judicial cooperation 86. In the aftermath of the 2015 
terrorist attacks in Europe (Paris and Copenhagen), which included, inter alia, the 
use of firearms that had been incorrectly deactivated or firearms assembled with 
badly deactivated components (as well as acoustic weapons being converted into 
real firearms)87, the EU, as already pointed out, has introduced an Implementing 
Regulation88 (including a revised annex)89 establishing common guidelines on 
deactivation standards and techniques. Its provisions aim to harmonize technical 
standards of the entire deactivation process (including marking and verification 
                                                          
procedures for deactivation of firearms render the weapons permanently deactivated. As requested 
by the co-legislators at the time of the amendment, Annex I - Part III point (a) states that 'the 
Commission shall issue common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques to ensure that 
deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable'. Until the common guidelines on 
deactivation are adopted, Member States are free to adopt the most suitable procedures in this 
regard. 
85 See Paragraph 3 (especially footnote n. 52), supra. Permanently deactivated firearms were 
generally no longer considered weapons under the domestic legislation of several Member States, 
and consequently they could be held by private persons and freely move within the internal market.  
86 See European Commission/SIPRI, Study to support an Impact Assessment on a possible initiative 
related to improving rules on deactivation, destruction and marking procedures of firearms in the EU, 
as well as on alarm weapons and replicas cit., p. 39.  
87 See European Investigative Collaborations-EIC, "Mapping the Weapons of Terror: East Europe's 
shadow gun market is fuelling terrorism in the west, as criminal gangs use legal loopholes and open 
borders to traffic weapons", 18/03/2016, (eic.network/projects/arms). 
88 See footnote n. 15, supra. For a criticism of technical requirements embodied in the original annex 
of the new Regulation on deactivation of firearms, see Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, From legal to 
lethal, op. cit., p. 51. 
89 See Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/337 of 5 March 2018 amending Implementing 
Regulation (EU) 2015/2403 establishing common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques 
for ensuring that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable, in OJEU, L 65/1, 
8/03/2018.  
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requirements), ensuring that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly 
inoperable90. Subsequent Directive 2017/853/EU provides for a more 
comprehensive regulation of converted firearms. National registries must keep 
records of deactivated firearms91 and their owners. Deactivated firearms must now 
be classified as category C (firearms and weapons subject to declaration)92. As a 
consequence, deactivated firearms now fall within the scope of the Firearms 
directive, and are consequently submitted to all its requirements with reference to 
possession and circulation. The new Firearms Directive also focuses on acoustic 
expansion weapons (AEW)93, given their easily convertibility to lethal firearms. It 
establishes that AEW have to be classified in the same legal category as the original 
weapon and are therefore subject to the same restrictions as their unaltered 
version94. Also Alarm weapons are included within the scope of Directive 
2017/853/EU. States must classify alarm pistols that are capable of being converted 
as real firearms95. The determination of which alarm weapons qualify as being 
capable of conversion is to be established based on manufacturing characteristics96. 
The Commission will adopt technical specifications on conversion through 
implementing acts97. 
 
 
 
                                                          
90 The Implementing Regulation is based on the criteria for deactivation developed by the Permanent 
International Commission for the Proof of Small Arms (the CIP).  
91 ‘Deactivated firearms’ means firearms that have been rendered permanently unfit for use by 
deactivation, ensuring that all essential components of the firearm in question have been rendered 
permanently inoperable and incapable of removal, replacement or modification in a manner that 
would permit the firearm to be reactivated in any way; see art. 1, para. 1(7) Directive 91/477/EEC, 
as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU . 
92 See Annex I, Part IV category C, para. 6 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 
2017/853/EU . 
93 Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, From legal to lethal, op. cit., p. 52, question if Directive 
2017/853/EU also applies to firearms altered to Flobert calibres; see footnote n. 80, supra.  
94 See Annex I, new categories A9, B8 and C5 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 
2017/853/EU. 
95 See new art. 10a, para. 2 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. 
96 See new art. 10bis, para. 1 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. 
97 See new art. 10a, para. 3 Directive 91/477/EEC, as amended by Directive 2017/853/EU. 
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7. Criminalization and prosecution of IFT  
The criminalization and prosecution of certain acts are crucial to tackle IFT. EU 
legislation does not provide for a wide framework criminalizing IFT. Directive 
91/477/ECC (as amended by Directive 2008/51/EC and Directive 2017/853/EU) 
does not cover at all criminalization of IFT. This omission is not unexpected since 
the Firearms Directive does not have a criminal law focus. A general provision on 
sanctions for infringements of the national rules adopted pursuant to the Firearms 
Directive is set out in the revised Article 16 of Directive 2008/51/EC. Accordingly, 
national legislations have to establish adequate penalties (effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive) with reference to IFT98. A previous proposal of the Commission 
expanded the text of Article 16 establishing an obligation for Member States to make 
IFT a serious crime99. Moreover, this proposal extended criminalization to actions 
such as attempts, or participation as an accomplice, which cannot be directly 
qualified as IFT100. However, this draft provision was finally deleted from the final 
text of Directive 2008/51/EC.  
EU Member States’ obligation to domestically criminalize IFT arises from their 
ratification of the UNFP, which deals with IFT as a typical form of ‘transnational 
organized crime’101. However, UNFP, in itself, does provide for very wide legal 
                                                          
98 A similar provision is embodied in Recital 16 of Regulation (EU) No 258/2012 (see, footnote n. 35, 
supra).  
99 See Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Directive 91/477/EEC on control of the acquisition and possession of weapons, COM(2006) 93 final, 
2/3/2006.  
100 Ibid., proposal of new art. 16. 
101 Transnational crimes refer to a category of crimes which are dealt with by an emerging branch of 
international law known as ‘Transnational Criminal Law’ (see Tom Obokata, Transnational organised 
crime in international law, Oxford, 2010, pp. 30-31), which does not establish individual criminal 
responsibility in international law, nor does it prohibit a conduct directly. Instead, it promotes, by 
means of international treaties, such as the UNTOC and UNFP (see footnotes n. 30-31, supra), indirect 
suppression of a crime through domestic criminal law by imposing obligations on States to enact 
legislation. In some cases, IFT can be prosecuted under ‘International criminal Law’, which, on the 
contrary, directly prohibits international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) 
and establishes an individual criminal responsibility. These cases refer to arms transfers which 
constitute complicity (aiding and abetting) in international crimes; in particular, in the event that the 
supplier of arms (the trafficker) provides arms to a recipient (the principal perpetrator of the crime) 
to be used in committing genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes; for an overview of this 
profile see Antonio Leandro, Arms transfer and complicity in war crimes, in Fausto Pocar, Marco 
Pedrazzi, Micaela Frulli (Eds.), War Crimes and the Conduct of Hostilities. Challenges to Adjudication 
and Investigation, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2013, p. 225 ss.; and Christian Ponti, Arms Transfer, 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Some Remarks after the Adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, in 
“Diritti umani e diritto internazionale”, vol. 7, 2013, n. 3, p. 662 ss. 
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definitions of IFT offences. Article 5 of the UNFP stipulates that each State Party 
must adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as 
criminal offences acts committed intentionally, the illicit manufacturing102, or illicit 
trafficking in firearms103, and falsification or illicit obliteration, removal or altering 
of marking(s) of firearms104. UNFP leaves a considerable margin of discretion to 
States Parties in matters of IFT criminalization, and the related elements of level and 
type of penalties, in line with their legal traditions. In 2014, the Commission 
published a study105 which analyzed the legal framework in all Member States, 
including the definitions of specific offences relating to firearms trafficking, 
penalties and sanctions and other complementarity aspects (i.e. aggravating 
circumstances or mitigating factors; liability of legal persons; and the notion of 
intent and negligence). The Commission concluded its report by stating that as a 
result of the different legal cultures of Member States and this ‘non-prescriptive 
approach’ of the UNFP, there is a considerable diversity of legal frameworks in 
relation to IFT offences and penalties at the national level106. This research also 
underlined that the lack of harmonization with regard to the definition of offences 
and penalties for IFT could hinder cross-border efforts to combat IFT107. For 
instance, as a consequence of the above-mentioned diversity of national legislation 
on sanctions, cross-border cooperation by police and judicial authorities could be 
hampered108. In this regard, harmonization of the sanctions regime among EU 
Member States could facilitate smoother application of many preventive and 
investigative measures, and minimize the so called ‘forum shopping’ by criminals109.  
 
 
                                                          
102 Art. 5, para. 1a UNFP.  
103 Art. 5, para. 1b UNFP. 
104 Art. 5, para. 1c UNFP.  
105 See European Commission, Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for Combatting Illicit 
Firearms Trafficking in the European Union, Final Report, 2014. 
106 Ibid., p. 87. 
107 Ibid., p. 73. 
108 Ibid., p. 78.  
109 According to this theory, criminals may pick and choose EU jurisdictions between which to move 
illicit firearms on the basis that such activity carries a lower (or a non-existing) penalty if the 
offenders are caught in the chosen Member State(s).  
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8. Conclusion  
The EU has adopted several legal binding instruments to counteract IFT, but no 
single tool regulates all the different aspects of this criminal activity. This study 
demonstrates that with the adoption of Directive 2017/853/EU, the legislator has 
consolidated a positive legislative trend inaugurated by Directive 2008/51/EC, 
particularly aiming to strengthen the ‘security issues’ linked to the possession and 
circulation of licit and illicit firearms. In line with the recommendations of the 
Commission, Directive 2017/853/EU will bring a decisive improvement in several 
areas of the EU legal framework to detect, investigate and prosecute IFT. First, 
Directive 2017/853/EU will considerably strengthen legal measures aimed at 
effectively tracing illicit firearms, thanks to its more harmonized rules on markings, 
as well as to the newly envisaged electronic system to exchange information on licit 
and illicit firearms among Member States. Second, the new Firearms Directive will 
establish an effective legal basis for a common regulation of ‘converted firearms’ in 
the EU, by introducing innovative requirements and obligations on deactivated 
firearms and alarm weapons110. All these norms, if properly translated into domestic 
legislation, will offer a great contribution to countering this emerging ‘new’ form of 
IFT throughout Europe, which has been for a long time confined to a ‘grey area’ 
between the licit and illicit markets. The guiding role of the Commission envisaged 
by Directive 2017/853/EU will facilitate this process.  
Notwithstanding this undeniable progress, the EU still lacks a legislative policy to 
fight all aspects of IFT comprehensively. In particular, it would be desirable to 
introduce further legislative intervention with the purpose of effectively 
harmonizing Member States’ substantive criminal law on IFT (common definitions 
on offences and penalties), including the illegal possession and illicit trafficking of 
converted firearms. This achievement would reduce legal uncertainty on behalf of 
police and investigating authorities, as well as facilitate prosecutions, where 
difficulties are often the result of deficient national legislation111. It will also 
                                                          
110 Future efforts to address firearms conversion should also focus on the destruction of surplus 
firearms; on this point see Nicolas Florquin, Benjamin King, From legal to lethal, op. cit., p. 52. 
111 According to the Commission (see Study to Support an Impact Assessment on Options for 
Combatting Illicit Firearms Trafficking in the European Union cit., pp. 138-139) there are also 
significant complications of tackling cross-border IFT of a non-legal nature, such as lack of resources, 
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constrain opportunities for criminals to exploit loopholes, as well as reduce their 
incentives for forum shopping between EU jurisdictions. The legal basis for such an 
intervention lies in art. Article 83(1) TFEU. This provides for the establishment of 
minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the 
area of IFT with a cross-border dimension, given that this is necessary as a 
consequence of the nature or impact of this offence or due to a special need to 
combat such trafficking on a common EU basis. However, in considering any EU 
initiative in this direction it is necessary to bear in mind at least two challenging 
issues. First, there is likely to be political sensitivity in harmonizing the constituent 
elements (actus reus and mens rea) and other related elements, including penalties, 
of the illicit firearms trafficking offence, where and to the extent that these involve 
fundamental principles of criminal law at the national level112. Second, in the last 
fifteen years, the EU criminal law legislative policy has been predominantly driven 
by the paradigm of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions (on which 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union is based)113, with very limited 
actions aiming to harmonize substantive criminal law of Member States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
conflicting policy priorities (for example with anti-terror legislation) and lack of enforcement of 
existing laws. 
112 The study of the Commission (id., p. 139) points out issues such as aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance, sanctions and penalties, and the factor of negligence and degrees of intent to commit 
the offence of IFT. 
113 See, for instance, (2002/584/JHA) Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European 
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (EAW), in OJEC L 190, 
18/07/2002, and Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters (EIO), in OJEU, L 130/1, 01/05/2014), 
which both do apply, inter alia. to illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives (see art. 2 
para. 2 EAW and annex d EIO).  
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